Curtis Keller v. State of Tennessee The petitioner, Curtis Keller, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and evading arrest. In this appeal, the petitioner alleges that he was deprived of the effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel and that the | Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lamar Hudson v. State of Tennessee The Petitioner, Lamar Hudson, filed a petition for post-conviction relief challenging his guilty plea for attempted second degree murder and the resulting ten-year sentence. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appeals. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to obtain body camera footage and that the resulting guilty plea was, therefore, entered involuntarily. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the Petitioner relief. | Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Santos Morales The Defendant, Santos Morales, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B Felony. See T.C.A § 39-13-504 (2018). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to ten years at 100% service and ordered the Defendant to register as a sexual offender. See T.C.A § 40-39-201 (2019). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. | Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Delshun Jones v. State of Tennessee Petitioner, Delshun Jones, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. | Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Randy Massey The defendant, Randy Massey, appeals the Giles County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his six-year sentence for aggravated assault in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm. | Giles | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ralpheal Cameron Coffey The Appellant, Ralpheal Cameron Coffey, was convicted in the Knox County Criminal Court of various offenses, including four counts of possession of more than one-half gram of cocaine with intent to sell and deliver within one thousand feet of a school, Class A and B felonies, and two counts of vehicular homicide, Class C felonies. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged some of the convictions and ordered that the Appellant serve an effective forty-eight-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support some of the convictions, that the trial court erred by admitting the cocaine into evidence because there was a “break” in the chain of custody, and that his effective forty-eight-year sentence is excessive. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. | Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua Travis Griffith A Warren County jury convicted the Defendant, Joshua Travis Griffith, of three counts of aggravated statutory rape, and the trial court sentenced him to a total effective sentence of three years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court: (1) erroneously allowed the State to present evidence outside the scope of the indictment, as well as evidence of his transmission of hepatitis B to the victim, which should have been excluded pursuant to Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b); (2) erroneously failed to declare a mistrial after the State’s motion to amend the indictment in the presence of the jury; and (3) erroneously failed to grant his motion for judgments of acquittal. He lastly contends that the cumulative effect of the errors violated his right to a fair trial. After review, we conclude that errors occurred during trial; however, consistent with our conclusion that those errors were harmless, the trial court’s judgments are affirmed. | Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Regions Bank v. Nathan I. Prager The issue in this appeal is whether the Plaintiff’s lawsuit is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The Plaintiff originally filed suit against the Defendant in the Circuit Court for Shelby County in May 2014. Unbeknownst to the parties, the trial court sua sponte dismissed the lawsuit for failure to prosecute. Upon learning of the dismissal over ten months later, the Plaintiff moved to set aside the dismissal. The trial court denied the Plaintiff’s request to set aside the dismissal but, articulating an erroneous reading of Rule 41.02(3) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, entered an order that stated the dismissal did not bar the Plaintiff from refiling its lawsuit. When the Plaintiff refiled its lawsuit in August 2017, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on the doctrine of res judicata. Despite language to the contrary in its prior order, the trial court granted the Defendant’s motion, holding that the dismissal of the original lawsuit operated as an adjudication on the merits. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the second lawsuit. We conclude that the doctrine of res judicata does not bar the Plaintiff’s lawsuit. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, vacate the trial court’s judgment, and reinstate the Plaintiff’s lawsuit. | Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Ciara Dawn Beaty v. Adam Scott Beaty This is an appeal from a divorce involving one minor child. In fashioning an initial parenting schedule, the trial court named the mother primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child and entered a parenting plan awarding 242 days of parenting time to the mother and 123 days to the father. The father appealed. Because we conclude that the trial court’s order regarding the residential parenting schedule does not contain sufficient findings of fact such that meaningful appellate review is possible, we vacate the order as to the parenting plan and remand for findings of fact and conclusions of law to facilitate appellate review. | Pickett | Court of Appeals | |
Theresa Doty v. City of Johnson City This is a personal injury action in which the defendant tortfeasor claims that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence concerning plaintiff’s claimed medical expenses. On appeal, we affirm the trial court’s rulings on the admissibility of evidence. | Washington | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nathan Craig Defendant, Nathan Craig, pled guilty to robbery and was sentenced to four years, suspended to a ten-year sentence of supervised probation. Defendant’s probation officer filed a probation violation warrant alleging that Defendant had violated the terms of his probation. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of the four-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. | Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Derious Grandberry The Defendant, Derious Grandberry, was convicted at trial of carjacking and aggravated robbery. He received an effective sentence of twenty years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of the offenses, that the trial court erred by failing to weigh the evidence itself as the thirteenth juror, that the trial court erred in allowing the State to admit the victim’s photographic lineup identification of him into evidence, and that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the maximum sentence. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. | Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Casey L. Redmon v. State of Tennessee The Petitioner, Casey L. Redmon, appeals from the McNairy County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his 2014 guilty-pleaded conviction of burglary. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in summarily denying his petition for being untimely filed. Specifically, he argues that he is serving an illegal sentence based upon the Tennessee Department of Correction’s (TDOC) incorrect calculation of his sentence and that an illegal sentence can be remedied at any time. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. | McNairy | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mario Norfleet v. State of Tennessee The petitioner, Mario Norfleet, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition. | Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Yates A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, James Yates, of aggravated robbery and assault. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of thirty years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions and argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand the case for entry of a judgment form in count 2. | Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Halliburton v. Tennessee Board of Parole After being denied parole and exhausting all administrative remedies, an inmate filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court of Davidson County. The chancery court dismissed the petition pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-812 because the inmate had unpaid court costs from previous litigation. Finding no error, we affirm. | Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re James W. et al. This case involves a petition to terminate parental rights. The petition was filed by the Department of Children’s Services against the biological mother of several minor children. In the petition, the Department alleged five grounds for termination: (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; (2) abandonment by exhibiting a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children prior to incarceration; (3) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; (4) persistence of conditions; and (5) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to parent. After a trial on the petition, the trial court found that the Department established all five grounds and that termination was in the best interest of the children. As a result, the trial court terminated the mother’s parental rights. We affirm the trial court’s decision and remand. | Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth Kay Tomes v. Michael Joe Tomes In this post-divorce dispute, the wife challenges the trial court’s determination that she was in contempt of the divorce decree for failing to return certain personal property to the husband. We find no error in the trial court’s contempt ruling or in its denial of the wife’s motion for Rule 60 relief. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s decision in all respects. | Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly Medders v. Landon Newby, Et Al. An insurance company denied coverage for an accident its insured had with an uninsured/underinsured motorist because the insured had a “non-owner’s” policy, and the car she was driving did not fit the definition of a “non-owned auto.” The trial court concluded, following a bench trial on the bifurcated issue of coverage, that the insured’s policy did not cover the accident, and the insured appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. | Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gary Bush The Defendant, Gary Bush, appeals the trial court’s summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 in which he challenged his life sentence resulting from his first degree murder conviction in 2008 for an offense that occurred in 1982. On appeal, the Defendant argues that he was sentenced under the 1989 Criminal Sentencing Reform Act rather than the law in effect when he committed the offense. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. | Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marcel Holbrook A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Marcel Holbrook, of first degree premeditated murder, attempted first degree murder, and possession of a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of life plus twenty-seven years. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence a photograph of an SKS rifle and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. | Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gregory Charles Hoppe v. Susan Lynn Hoppe In this post-divorce visitation dispute, the father appeals the denial of his petition to modify the permanent parenting plan and require the mother’s visitation to be supervised “indefinitely.” Before the divorce, the mother’s visitation was suspended after she falsely accused the father of sexually abusing the parties’ minor son. The mother’s visitation was restored when she presented evidence that she was in mental health therapy for her “obsessive” fears. Two months later, in early 2016, the parties agreed to a permanent parenting plan that required the mother to, inter alia, continue her therapy. The parties also agreed for their son to attend counseling to help him remain psychologically healthy despite the parties’ contentious relationship. The mother did not, however, continue her treatment as agreed, and she soon resumed making allegations against the father. Thus, just three months after the parenting plan was entered, her visitation was suspended again. The mother’s visitation remained restricted for a year, during which she struggled to comply with various court orders. In April 2017, the parties agreed for the mother’s visitation to be restored after she presented evidence she was progressing again in her mental health treatment. The parties also agreed for the son to continue counseling for another 18months. Then, in November 2018, the mother made additional false allegations against the father. The father then filed a petition to modify the parenting plan and restrict the mother’s visitation “indefinitely.” Finding the mother’s behavior endangered the children, the trial court significantly restricted the mother’s parenting time and allowed only limited supervised visitation pending a final hearing. Due to several procedural delays, the final hearing was not held until January 2020, by which time the mother’s visitation had been severely restricted for a year. After the hearing, the court denied the father’s petition and restored the mother’s visitation. The court was persuaded, in part, by evidence that the mother was progressing again in her therapy. The court credited the opinion of the mother’s clinical psychologist, who stated the mother had “gotten better,” understood “that she cannot say things that would alienate [the father from] the children,” was “a loving and devoted parent,” and would “now follow the rules.” The court also agreed with the psychologist’s opinion that the son needed more counseling because he needed “to be able to talk to somebody [he could] trust.” Based on these and other findings of fact, the trial court found no material change in circ*mstance existed; however, it ordered that the mother and the parties’ son continue therapy. The court also denied the mother’s request for an award of attorney fees as the “prevailing party” under the marital dissolution agreement and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c). Both parties appealed. Having determined the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that no material change of circ*mstance existed as of the time of trial, we affirm the denial of the father’s petition to modify the parenting plan. We vacate, however, the court’s order requiring the son to continue therapy because the issue was not before the court. We also affirm the denial of the mother’s request to recover her attorney’s fees. | Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Linda R. Kerley v. George Olin Kerley As issues regarding contempt and attorney fees remain pending, the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment. As such, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. | Bledsoe | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jasper Lee Vick The pro se Petitioner, Jasper Lee Vick, appeals the summary dismissal of his fourth “Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence.” Upon our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the motion. | Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Brittany Borngne Ex Rel. Miyona Hyter v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority Et Al. This health care liability action arises from injuries suffered by a minor, Miyona Hyter, during her birth. Miyona Hyter, a minor by and through her next friend and mother, Brittany Borngne (“Plaintiff”) sued, among others, Dr. Michael Seeber who delivered the child via cesarean section and certified nurse midwife Jennifer Mercer who assisted with the birthing process. Plaintiff alleged that Nurse Mercer was negligent by failing to recognize concerning signs on the fetal monitoring strip and by failing to call Dr. Seeber for assistance sooner than she did. The Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”), by agreed order, granted Dr. Seeber partial summary judgment on all claims of direct negligence against him; he remained in the case as a defendant only upon Plaintiff’s theory that he was vicariously liable for Nurse Mercer’s actions as her supervising physician. During his deposition, Dr. Seeber declined to answer questions that he argued required him to render an expert opinion regarding Nurse Mercer’s care during times that Dr. Seeber was not present and had no involvement in Plaintiff’s care. The Trial Court declined to require Dr. Seeber to answer questions that “call[] for an opinion by Dr. Seeber that asks him to comment on the actions of other healthcare providers and does not involve his own actions, as required by Lewis v. Brooks,” 66 S.W.3d 883, 887-88 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). After Nurse Mercer’s deposition, she submitted an errata sheet that substantively altered her answers to some of the questions. Plaintiff moved to suppress the errata sheet, arguing that Tenn. R. Civ. P. 30.05 does not allow a witness to make substantive changes to her deposition testimony. The Trial Court denied the motion but allowed Plaintiff the opportunity to reopen Nurse Mercer’s deposition and to fully cross-examine her at trial about the changes. The case proceeded to trial before a jury, which returned a verdict in Defendants’ favor. We hold that the Trial Court erred by refusing to order Dr. Seeber to answer the questions at issue in his deposition. Deeming this case distinguishable from Lewis v. Brooks, we reverse the Trial Court in its declining to compel Dr. Seeber to testify concerning the conduct of his supervisee, Nurse Mercer, and remand for a new trial. | Hamilton | Court of Appeals |
